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The right to hold dual citizenship is an important political institution that is being adopted by an 
increasing number of countries. We argue that this institution can generate important social and economic 
benefits beyond its political dimension. Dual citizenship recognition by a country allows members of its 
diaspora who are citizens of their host countries to retain several legal advantages in their homelands, 
including unrestricted residency and easy access to investment opportunities, and provides multiple 
incentives to maintain ties with family, friends and communities, therefore facilitating the development of 
transnational solidarity and business networks. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship, and 
exploit cross-country and cross-time variation in the timing of dual citizenship recognition to estimate its 
economic impacts. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases foreign 
remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, raises GDP and household consumption, favors international labor 
mobility, and improves child survival. Additionally, dual citizenship is more effective in improving child 
survival than other institutional variables such as government stability and the absence of internal and 
external conflicts. In developed countries, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by 
US$1.44 billion, but increases gross capital formation and foreign direct investment by US$12 trillion and 
US$828 billion, respectively, raises household consumption, fosters trade, and provides incentives for 
low- and high-skilled workers to move to foreign countries. Expatriates living in dual citizenship-granting 
countries positively affect economic outcomes in their origin countries. We find no effect of dual 
citizenship recognition on public spending on health and education, which suggests that the diaspora 
plays little role in homeland politics.  
 
Keywords: Dual Citizenship Legislation, Private International Relations, Trade, Foreign Remittances, 
Investment, Child Survival, Institutions, Economic Development. 
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 1- Introduction 
Dual citizenship is a status in which a person is legally recognized as a citizen of more than one 
country. Legislation on dual citizenship varies widely across countries and time. Certain 
countries at some point have had policies that prohibit dual citizenship, in which people 
automatically lose their citizenship if they voluntarily acquire a foreign nationality. On the 
opposite end, other countries not only permit it, but in fact view it as a way of allowing their 
citizens to connect with the rest of the world. The number of countries allowing dual citizenship 
has substantially increased since the 1930s. While almost all countries prohibited dual 
citizenship in 1930, over 24% of developed countries and 26% of developing countries now 
allow it (see Figures 1-a and 1-b).  Debate on dual citizenship has revolved around its 
implications for the patriotism, cultural assimilation, and political participation of dual citizens in 
their new countries (Staton et al., 2007; Renshon, 2004, Blatter et al., 2009, Iheduru, 2011). 
Some scholars argue that individuals who obtain a second citizenship without giving up the 
benefits of their first citizenship may have dual loyalty, or may find it difficult to adopt the 
values of their second country, thus degrading national identity and cohesiveness (Guarnizo, 
Portes and Haller, 2003). While dual citizenship is primarily viewed by lawyers and political 
scientists as a political institution (Staton et al., 2007), in this study, we argue that dual 
citizenship is also likely to have important social and economic impacts. We assemble new panel 
data on dual citizenship legislation to investigate some of these economic impacts for developed 
and developing countries. In particular, we focus on the role of dual citizenship in connecting 
diasporas with origin countries, as well as its implications for the development of transnational 
solidarity and business networks, and the associated benefits for households and national 
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economies. Furthermore, we examine how dual citizenship legislation differs from other political 
institutions in terms of its economic impact. 
 
Individuals living outside of their country of origin most often become citizens of their host 
country because of the practical advantages that citizenship offers (Ruget and Usmanalieva, 
2010). Such advantages include unrestricted residency, legal employment, property ownership, 
retirement funds, and eligibility for social programs including welfare, healthcare, and public 
education. If denied dual citizenship rights by their origin country, such individuals lose all rights 
and public benefits attached to their first nationality, and incur a higher cost of maintaining ties 
with their families, friends and communities in the homeland as, for instance, a visa is now 
required to travel. In addition, due to the fact that most countries have restrictive policies on 
investment and property ownership by foreigners, members of the diaspora who have legally lost 
the public benefits attached to their first citizenship also lose the incentive and the right to invest 
in their origin country’s economic and political prosperity. Prohibiting dual citizenship therefore 
disconnects the diaspora from its homeland socially, economically and politically. 
 
Allowing dual citizenship, on the contrary, is likely to produce the opposite effects. Socially, 
recognition of dual citizenship is likely to increase connections between members of a country’s 
diaspora and their families, friends and communities in the origin country, developing 
transnational trust, cooperation, and solidarity, and therefore raising the potential for mutual 
assistance when needed. From the perspective of economic development, dual citizenship 
recognition is likely to facilitate the transfer of new ideas and technologies to the homeland by 
diasporic scientists and entrepreneurs, encouraging “brain circulation” (Nyarko, 2011), and 
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increasing the documented positive effects of brain drain – or, conversely, mitigating its negative 
impacts (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2008; Easterly and Nyarko, 2008; Bertoli and Brücker, 
2011). Dual citizenship may also foster investment by diasporic entrepreneurs by allowing them 
to invest, monitor their investments, and hold domestic business partners accountable in case of a 
legal dispute, without facing differential treatment due to foreign status.  Politically, dual 
citizenship is likely to encourage the diaspora to participate in homeland politics, encouraging 
political accountability and therefore affecting the allocation of public goods. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses regarding the likely impacts of dual citizenship, we consider 
three sets of outcome variables. The first set comprises the volume of remittances received by a 
country, and a country’s child mortality rate. Variables in this set measure the extent to which the 
diaspora is connected with the homeland, and the implications of this connection for household 
welfare. The second set comprises several macroeconomic indicators including gross capital 
formation, foreign direct investment net inflows, GDP, household expenditures, the volume of 
trade and the emigration rates of low- and high-skilled workers. The third set comprises 
government-controlled factors such as public spending on education and health. Any impact of 
dual citizenship on variables in this latter set would suggest that the diaspora affects the 
allocation of government funds to social programs. We estimate these effects separately for 
developed and developing countries. 2 
 
Endogeneity issues often lie at the heart of econometric analyses of causality. Confidence in the 
causal effects of dual citizenship in our analysis comes from it being mostly exogenous to 
                                                 
2We use the World Bank classification of developing countries as low and middle-income economies, and 
developed countries as high income economies (OECD and non-OECD countries). See Table 8 for the list of 
developing and developed countries used in the analysis. 
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foreign pressure. Indeed, the decision to allow dual citizenship follows a long legislative process, 
and is sometimes made through a referendum. Any external pressure affecting such a decision 
might therefore only come from a country’s diaspora, especially if they constitute a large enough 
population to wield political influence. We account for this factor in our analysis by controlling 
for the size of diasporic populations. Also, we control for the fraction of a country’s diaspora 
living in countries granting dual citizenship, as they are the ones most likely to exert pressure 
given the possibility that they have to legally obtain the citizenship of their host countries 
without having to give up their first citizenship. Moreover, we control for the potential financial 
power of the diasporic population, proxied by the average income and populations of the 
destination countries of a country’s emigrants, in the assumption that any external pressure 
exerted by the diaspora may be stronger as their financial power increases. We also control for 
institutional factors related to democracy. Furthermore, we control for time and country fixed 
effects, which takes care of potential sources of endogeneity that might vary over time but are 
identical for all countries in a given period, and those that might vary across countries but are 
fixed for each country over time, including, for instance, country-specific historical factors. 
 
We acknowledge that our concern for potential endogeneity issues associated with dual 
citizenship may be a bit exaggerated. In fact, most studies analyzing the causal impacts of public 
policies usually assume that policies are exogenous (e.g., Osili and Paulson, 2008; Besley and 
Persson, 2009), even when policy decisions are made by the executive power without consulting 
the legislative power. Dual citizenship decisions are both legislative and constitutional decisions, 
and thus involve many more decision-makers with possibly “conflicting” views than do 
executive decisions alone. This makes dual citizenship decisions complex and less likely to be 
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affected by external and foreign lobbies, including foreign investors. Moreover, the temporal 
pattern of the introduction of dual citizenship does not differ much between developed and 
developing countries (Figures 1-a and 1-b), especially after the 1950s when most developing 
countries gained their independence, which suggests that dual citizenship policies are not 
determined by a country’s level of economic development or level of democracy. As we argue 
later, among countries with very similar characteristics, some do recognize dual citizenship 
rights, while others do not, which indicates that these decisions may be random across countries 
and over time. 
 
We first examine the relationship between dual citizenship recognition and remittances.  In 
theory, this relationship is not easily predictable. As argued earlier, dual citizenship recognition 
by a country is likely to increase remittance inflows as it fosters the development of transnational 
solidarity and business networks. At the same time, it encourages members of the diaspora to 
acquire the nationality of their host countries, making it easier for them to sponsor close family 
members (e.g., parents, spouse, children, etc.) to become citizens as well. Once the latter 
individuals leave their origin country for their new country, there are no more incentives to 
remit, thus decreasing foreign remittances towards the origin country. However, since under 
most legislation, only close family members can be sponsored, dual citizenship recognition by a 
country is likely to decrease remittance inflows only if the predominant family structure in that 
country is “nuclear”, as opposed to “extended”. In collectivistic cultures or countries where 
family is defined more broadly, dual citizenship recognition is likely to foster remittance inflows, 
as emigrants will continue to remit to their distant family members and communities even after 
sponsoring and gathering their close family members. We therefore expect the effect of dual 
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citizenship on remittances to vary across countries. In particular, we expect the effect to be 
positive for developing countries, and negative for developed countries. 3 
 
A descriptive analysis of the relationship between dual citizenship and remittances is presented 
in Figure 2. It shows that countries allowing dual citizenship receive more remittances from their 
diasporic communities than those that do not.  This is true both for developed and developing 
countries.  In multivariate analysis, we exploit cross-country and cross-time variation in the 
introduction of dual citizenship rights to econometrically identify the causal effect of the latter 
variable on remittances. We confirm the results of the descriptive analysis for developing 
countries only. On average, the volume of remittances received by a developing country is about 
US$1.2 billion larger when it allows dual citizenship than when it does not. However, in a 
developed country that allows dual citizenship, remittance inflows decrease by US$1.4 billion. 
These results are consistent with the fact that the extended family is more prevalent in 
developing countries while the nuclear family is the norm in developed countries (Todaro and 
Smith, 2012).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the estimated impacts of dual citizenship on remittances are robust to the 
control of a wide range of variables including, but not limited to, the size of the diasporic 
population, the potential financial power of the diaspora, and the fraction of the diaspora living 
in dual citizenship-granting countries. Interestingly, the latter variable has a positive effect on 
remittances, and partly absorbs the effect of dual citizenship itself, which suggests that dual 
citizenship recognition by a country produces a greater effect among its dual citizens living 
                                                 
3Indeed, it has been argued that most developing countries have collectivistic cultures, whereas most developed 
countries are capitalistic and individualistic (Todaro and Smith, 2012). 
 7
abroad. Indeed, expatriates who reside in dual citizenship-granting countries have a greater 
propensity to send remittances to their origin country. 
  
We also examine the impact of dual citizenship recognition on child survival. This latter variable 
is unanimously considered an important indicator of household welfare in both developed and 
developing countries, as it responds promptly to better nutrition and improved health care 
(Boone, 1996; Ross, 2006). We find a positive effect of dual citizenship recognition on this 
outcome. Moreover, this effect is entirely mediated by remittances in developing countries, 
suggesting that dual citizenship-induced funds are primarily used for consumption purposes, 
which is consistent with the literature on the allocation of remittances (Gupta et al., 2007; Osili, 
2007; Clemens, 2011). Controls such as the size of the diasporic population as well as their 
potential financial power also improve child survival. 
 
Next, we turn to the second set of variables, which are macroeconomic indicators comprising 
GDP, household expenditures, the net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), gross capital 
formation, domestic credit to the private sector, trade volume, and emigration rates of low- and 
high-skilled workers. Importantly, estimating the effect of dual citizenship recognition on 
investment (measured by gross capital formation and FDI net inflows) in addition to remittances 
is motivated by the fact that the latter may not totally account for all funds directed to 
investment, especially in developed countries. When the banking system in the origin country is 
reliable, diasporic entrepreneurs may transfer important funds directly to their bank accounts. 
Therefore, dual citizenship recognition is likely to have a distinct effect on investment. Our 
analysis indeed supports this assertion, especially in developed countries, where dual citizenship 
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increases gross capital formation by US$12 trillion, and FDI net inflows by US$828 billion. It 
also fosters trade. In developing countries, dual citizenship recognition raises GDP. In both 
developed and developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases household 
consumption, and fosters international labor mobility, which indicates that dual citizenship may 
be used as an instrument to stimulate emigration and induce foreign remittances, given the 
positive impacts of immigrants’ productive inputs (see, e.g., Borjas (1995) for the US). The 
fraction of the diaspora living in dual citizenship-granting countries has a significant effect on 
most of these outcomes (e.g., trade, household consumption, GDP, and gross capital formation), 
showing that they constitute an engine of economic growth for their homelands.        
 
The estimate of the effects of dual citizenship on public spending on health and education shows 
no significant impact, which implies that the diasporic populations have little say in homeland 
politics. Importantly, diasporas do not seem to influence political outcomes in origin countries, 
which is consistent with the notion that dual citizenship legislation itself is exogenous to external 
pressure, although it may be used by a country as an instrument to attract investments from the 
same diasporas.  
 
Finally, we compare the effectiveness of dual citizenship and other institutional variables 
including government stability and the absence of internal and external conflicts in improving 
child survival. We find that dual citizenship is more effective in general, although its effect is 
less pronounced in developed countries. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we situate our study in the 
extant literature. In Section 3, we present our econometric strategy, and show our results in 
Sections 4 and 5. We discuss and conclude our study in Section 6. 
 
2 Related Literature 
To our knowledge, the economic impacts of dual citizenship legislation have not been widely 
studied. In an interesting paper, Ebeke (2011) shows that dual citizenship recognition positively 
affects foreign remittance inflows. The overlap between this study and ours is very small as we 
significantly differ in our research questions, methodology, and findings. First, Ebeke (2011) 
only focuses on developing countries, whereas we look at both developing and developed 
countries, showing that the effect of dual citizenship on remittances differs for these countries. 
Second, Ebeke (2011) uses a cross-sectional approach and limits his analysis to the period 2000-
2008. By contrast, our analysis is based on data spanning a much longer period (1960-2010), 
which allows us to exploit variation in dual citizenship policies across countries and time, and 
also lets us control for potential sources of endogeneity. Further, we significantly differ in our 
scope, as we study the effect of dual citizenship legislation on several other important variables 
(GDP, gross capital formation, volume of trade, net inflows of foreign direct investment, 
domestic credit to the private sector, household consumption expenditures, public spending on 
education, public health expenditures, child survival, and international labor mobility of low- and 
high-skilled workers). Also, we are among the first to document the importance of remittance 
flows to developed countries as well as their effects on certain economic outcomes, finding that 
foreign remittance inflows decrease the unemployment rate and increase child mortality. These 
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results are consistent with findings that positive economic shocks lead to adverse health 
outcomes in developed countries (see, e.g., Ruhm (2000) for the US).   
 
Given the political nature of dual citizenship legislation, we view our study as contributing to the 
literature on the economic impacts of institutions. To cite a few examples of this literature, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that improvement in property rights positively affects GDP 
per capita. Besley (1995) finds that institutions that improve land rights induce investment 
incentives in Ghana. Knack and Keefer (1995) also find that institutions that protect property 
rights are important determinants of economic growth and investment. Mauro (1995) shows that 
corruption lowers investment and growth. Asiedu and Lien (2011) find that democracy 
encourages foreign direct investment depending on the level of minerals and oil exported. Osili 
and Paulson (2008) find that immigrants in the US coming from countries with honest 
institutions have a greater propensity to own stock. Our findings on the impacts of dual 
citizenship suggest that dual citizenship is primarily an institution that protects the rights of 
members of the diaspora in their homeland. However, as we show, the mechanisms through 
which dual citizenship operates differ from those documented in the extant literature on the 
economic impacts of institutions.  
 
Other studies have investigated the effects of institutions on a range of human capital variables. 
Democracy has been found to improve infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, and access to 
water and sanitation (Moon and Dixon, 1985; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Tavares and 
Waczing, 2001; Zweifel and Navia, 2000; Stasavage, 2005; Ross, 2006). Lazarova and Mosca 
(2008) find that good governance increases life expectancy. Gupta et al. (2000) document the 
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negative effects of corruption on health care and education. Our study is related in that it 
documents, for the first time, the effect of dual citizenship, viewed as an institution, on child 
survival. Additionally, our study is novel in that it compares the effect of dual citizenship with 
that of other institutional variables such as government stability and the absence of internal and 
external conflicts, and finds that the former has a larger effect in both low- and high-income 
economies. 
 
3 Econometric Strategy 
3.1 Data 
We combine a newly assembled dataset on dual citizenship with data from a variety of sources to 
estimate the economic effects of dual citizenship.  More details on the data sources are provided 
as we describe the variables used in the analysis. 
 
3.1.1 Dual Citizenship 
We obtain information on dual citizenship legislation from the Citizenship Laws of the World 
(2001) database assembled by the Office of Personnel Management of the US Government. This 
database provides detailed information on dual citizenship legislation for 206 countries, 
classifying countries into those which accept dual citizenship and those which do not.  
 
The Citizenship Laws of the World (2001) database has two limitations. First, information only 
covers the period prior to 2001. Second, it does not provide information on when dual citizenship 
was introduced for those countries that allowed it. We update this database until 2009, and 
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further complete it with information on the year of the introduction of dual citizenship. We 
obtain this information from the official websites of various governments. 
 
Figure 1-a shows the proportion of countries that introduced dual citizenship rights at some point 
during the period 1929-2009. As evidenced in this figure, the introduction of dual citizenship 
recognition by developed countries is spread out over this time interval, but most developing 
countries introduced dual citizenship rights only after 1950. This difference in the temporal 
patterns of dual citizenship recognition might stem from the fact that most developing countries 
gained their political independence only after 1950. In particular, dual citizenship recognition 
accelerated during the 1990s in these countries. Figure 1-b shows that until the early 1990s, 
developed countries were slightly more likely to recognize dual citizenship rights than 
developing countries, but this pattern has subsequently reversed. In 2009, 26% of developing 
countries allowed dual citizenship, while it was allowed by 24% of developed countries.  
 
Interestingly, the fact that the pattern of dual citizenship recognition does not differ much 
between developed and developing countries after 1950 suggests that dual citizenship policies 
are not determined by the level of economic development or by such institutional factors as 
democracy. Among countries with similar characteristics, some recognize dual citizenship rights, 
but others do not. For instance, the US, Canada, France and Togo allow dual citizenship, but 
Germany, Japan, Austria and Cameroon do not. As discussed earlier, this fact makes it hard to 
think of dual citizenship as being endogenous to unobservable factors likely to affect our 
outcome variables, which is useful for the econometric identification of the effect of dual 
citizenship legislation.                      
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3.1.2 Dependent Variables 
We estimate the effects of dual citizenship on three sets of variables. The first set comprises 
foreign workers’ remittances and the under-five mortality rate. Remittances represent current 
transfers by emigrants who are employed or intend to remain employed for more than a year in a 
foreign country in which they are considered residents. Data on remittances are available only 
for the period 1970-2010. The under-five mortality rate is the probability that a child dies before 
his fifth birthday. Any impact of dual citizenship on these variables would reflect social 
connections between members of a country’s diaspora and their families, friends, and 
communities in their homeland.    
 
The second set of outcomes comprises gross domestic product (GDP), gross capital formation, 
the volume of trade, foreign direct investment, household final consumption expenditures, 
domestic credit to the private sector, and emigration rates of low-, medium- and high-skilled 
workers. These variables provide a global picture of a country’s economy. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added plus product taxes minus subsidies. Gross capital formation (also called gross 
domestic investment) is composed of an economy’s fixed assets and the net changes in the 
amount of inventories. The volume of trade is the sum of merchandise exports and imports. 
Foreign direct investment (net inflows) is new investment inflows less disinvestment and is 
composed of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, long and short-term capital. Household 
final consumption expenditures are the market value of goods and services purchased by 
households. Domestic credit to the private sector is measured as the total financial resources 
provided to the private sector. It measures the level of financial development. Most of the 
variables in this set are drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2011) of the 
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World Bank. Information on emigration rates of low-, medium- and high-skilled workers is 
provided by Docquier and Marfouk (2005), and has been used in Beine et al. (2008). 
 
The third set of variables comprises government-controlled factors such as public spending on 
education and health. These variables measure the allocation of government funds to social 
programs. Public health spending is calculated as total health expenditures from governmental 
budgets, external loans, grants, and social health insurance funds. Public spending on education 
is expressed as the total spending of the government on education. These variables are obtained 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2011). 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all these variables. Columns 1 and 2 report mean values 
and standard deviations for the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 report mean values and standard 
deviations for the subsample of developing countries, while Columns 5 and 6 show mean values 
and standard deviations for the subsample of developed countries. In Table 9, we summarize 
information on the definition and sources of variables used in the analysis. Our sample is 
composed of 141 developing countries and 37 developed countries.  
 
3.2 Model Specification 
We use a panel of ten average five-year periods from 1960-2010 for our analysis. We estimate 
the following econometric model:  
 
'
, 0 1 , , 2c t c t c t c t c ty Citizen X ,                 (1) 
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where ,c ty  represents an outcome of interest measured for country c in period t; 
measures dual citizenship for country c in period t; it takes on value 1 if the country 
permits dual citizenship for its citizens in period t, and 0 if not. Note that as we use a panel of ten 
periods of five years each for our estimations, the dual citizenship variable takes on value 1 in 
period t if the year in which dual citizenship was introduced belongs to that period. Also, we do 
not have an instance in which dual citizenship recognition has been reversed after being 
introduced, which implies that if the dual citizenship variable takes on value 1 in period t, it takes 
the same value in subsequent periods. All other variables are averaged over each period.  is 
a vector of control variables. 
,c tcitizen
,c tX
c  is a country dummy variable, and t  is a period dummy 
variable. ,c t  is an error term, assumed to be uncorrelated with dual citizenship given all the 
controls (see below for a discussion). The coefficient 1  is the main parameter of interest, and 
2  is a vector of coefficients capturing the effects of the control variables in . ,c tX
A number of studies have used a similar model to analyze the impact of new policies on a range 
of outcomes (e.g., Osili and Paulson, 2008). 
 
3.2.1 Conditional Exogeneity of Dual Citizenship 
Policies are usually viewed as exogenous (e.g., Osili and Paulson, 2008, Besley and Persson, 
2009). In our analysis, as argued earlier, the fact that countries with similar characteristics have 
different laws regarding dual citizenship makes it hard to think of dual citizenship as being 
endogenous to unobservable factors that might also affect our outcomes. The legislative and 
constitutional nature of dual citizenship also enhances the exogeneity of dual citizenship 
decisions vis-à-vis external factors (e.g., foreign investors or aliens), as these decisions involve 
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many decision-makers with possibly “conflicting” views, unlike policy decisions made by the 
executive branch of a government.  
 
Nevertheless, we control for a range of variables. First, by estimating time and country fixed 
effect regressions, we control for time trends, for possible sources of endogeneity that are 
identical for all countries in a given period, but might vary over time, and for those that are time-
invariant for each country, including for instance historical factors. Our identification therefore 
comes from comparing the level of an outcome before and after dual citizenship is introduced in 
a country. One could also think of dual citizenship as being endogenous to pressure exerted by 
members of the diaspora on the origin country’s government. To account for this, we control for 
several variables capturing external pressure. First, we control for the size of the diaspora in most 
of our analyses. This is because if diasporic populations are large enough, they are likely to wield 
political influence. We also control for the fraction of a country’s diaspora living in dual 
citizenship-granting countries. Indeed, any external pressure is most likely to come from these 
populations, as they are the ones who would gain most from dual citizenship rights being 
allowed, especially given the fact that these rights are recognized by their countries of residence. 
We also control for the potential financial power of the diaspora, proxied by the average GDP 
and population of their host countries, in the assumption that members of the diaspora living in 
richer countries are more likely to fund lobbies in order to influence homeland politics.4 We note 
that the fraction of a country’s diaspora living in dual citizenship-granting countries and average 
GDP of destination countries are strongly correlated (the coefficient of correlation is 0.60), and 
                                                 
4These averages are weighted by the fraction of a country’s emigrants living in each of the other countries in each 
period. For instance, if there are 5 countries C1,…C5, and the fraction of country C1’s emigrants in country Ci in 
period t is Pit (P1t=0), and if Zit is the value of a variable Z (e.g., dual citizenship rights, GDP, population) in country 
Ci in period t, then the average of Z in the destination countries of country C1’s emigrants in period t is 
0Z1t+P2tZ2t+P3tZ3t+P4tZ4t+P5tZ5t.   
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so, we do not control for both simultaneously. Further, we control for a range of other 
institutional variables related to political stability and democracy. We believe that all these 
controls address possible endogeneity issues associated with dual citizenship. Indeed, we assume 
that conditioned upon these controls, dual citizenship is exogenous (E(Citizen  |X,  ,  )=0). 
Also working in our favor is the fact that dual citizenship has no impact on the allocation of 
public funding to education and health, indirectly suggesting that the diaspora has limited 
influence in homeland politics.    
 
3.2.2   Organizing the Analysis 
We analyze the impacts of dual citizenship legislation in three main parts. First, we consider the 
sets of variables reflecting the economy and allocation of government funds to social programs. 
In the second part, we consider remittances and child mortality. We pay special attention to the 
latter variable since child mortality, unlike other human capital outcome variables, responds 
quickly to better nutrition and improved access to health care, and is therefore more sensitive to 
exogenous increases in income. It has been used as an important measure of poverty in 
developing countries (Ross, 2006), and as an indicator of child well-being in developed countries 
(Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002; Almond, Chay and Greenstone, 2006; Condliffe and Link, 
2008).  
 
In the third part, we compare the effectiveness of dual citizenship and other institutional 
variables including government stability and the absence of internal and external conflicts in 
terms of their effects on child survival. These institutional variables are obtained from the 
Political Risk Services/International Country Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG) database.  
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4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Dual Citizenship Legislation, Macroeconomic Outcomes, and Government Spending 
In this section, we estimate the impact of dual citizenship legislation on macroeconomic 
indicators and on the allocation of government funds to education and health. The results are 
presented in Table 2A for developing countries and Table 2B for developed countries. For each 
outcome variable, we first estimate the effect of dual citizenship without any controls, and then 
we control for country and period fixed effects, the fraction of the diaspora’s population living in 
dual citizenship-granting countries, and the average population of destination countries.  We 
additionally control for the population size of each country when estimating the impact of dual 
citizenship on GDP and household consumption, and for population size and GDP when 
estimating the effect of dual citizenship on public spending on health and education.   
 
We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition raises GDP and household 
consumption. The effect of dual citizenship on GDP is mediated by the fraction of the diaspora’s 
population living in dual citizenship-granting countries, as this effect loses statistical significance 
only after we control for this latter variable in fixed effects regressions. The effects of dual 
citizenship on the net inflows of FDI, trade, and domestic credit to the private sector are positive, 
but are not statistically significant once we control for time and country fixed effects. 
 
In developed countries, dual citizenship recognition raises the net inflows of FDI by over 
US$877 billion, gross capital formation by US$11.7 trillion, and trade volume by US$12.8 
trillion. It also has a positive and statistically significant effect on household consumption.  
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We also find that dual citizenship recognition by a country provides incentives for its low- and 
high-skilled workers to move to other countries without facing the risk of losing their origin 
citizenship, showing that dual citizenship recognition as a political institution improves a 
country's ability to stimulate international labor mobility, which temporally solves the problem 
of unemployment. 
 
We do not find any effect of dual citizenship recognition on public spending on health and 
education, which suggests that the diaspora plays little role in homeland politics. Importantly, 
diasporas do not seem to influence political outcomes in origin countries, which is consistent 
with the notion that dual citizenship legislation itself is exogenous to external pressure, although 
it may be used by a country as an instrument to attract investments from the same diasporas.  
 
It is also worth noting that members of the diaspora living in dual citizenship-granting countries 
have important and statistically significant impacts on several outcomes including GDP and 
household consumption for both developed and developing countries, and trade, domestic credit 
to the private sector, and gross capital formation for developed countries.  These effects show 
that these diasporic populations have a greater incentive to invest in their origin country, 
therefore constituting an engine of economic growth.        
  
4.2 Dual Citizenship Legislation and Foreign Remittance Inflows 
In this section, we estimate the impact of dual citizenship legislation on workers' remittances. 
The results are presented in Table 3. We report the results both for developing countries and 
developed countries. In results not shown, we test a similar specification of the model, but 
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replace the continuous variables by their logarithmic transformation, and our conclusions 
regarding the effect of dual citizenship do not change. In Columns 1 and 5 of each panel, dual 
citizenship is the only predictor. We find that it positively affects remittances, but the effect is 
statistically significant only for developed countries. In Columns 2 and 6, we control for period 
and country fixed effects, country population size, the size of the diaspora (measured by the 
stock of emigrants), the inflation rate, and financial development (measured by domestic credit 
to the private sector). We find that recognition of dual citizenship raises remittance inflows by 
US$1.190 billion in developing countries. The findings show that a mere cross-sectional 
regression grossly underestimates the effect of dual citizenship, as the fixed-effect coefficient is 
about 3.25 times larger than the coefficient obtained from the cross-sectional analysis. For 
developed countries, however, the coefficient associated with dual citizenship becomes negative 
and statistically significant. As argued in the introduction, a plausible reason for this negative 
effect is that emigrants from developed countries who become citizens of their host countries 
remit less once they reunite their close family members with them in their new countries. This 
behavior is in contrast with that adopted by emigrants from collectivistic cultures, which are 
predominant in developing countries. 
 
The fact that the effect of dual citizenship on remittances is greater for developing countries also 
suggests that the additional funds generated by dual citizenship are aimed at poverty alleviation 
in the origin country. It also indicates, as Pongou (2010) has shown theoretically, that developing 




In Columns 3 and 7, we additionally control for the average GDP and population of destination 
(or remittances-sending) countries, our proxy for the diaspora’s financial power. This decreases 
the effect of dual citizenship, which shows that this effect is partially driven by emigrants living 
in richer countries. In Columns 4 and 8, we replace the average GDP of destination countries by 
the fraction of the diaspora populations living in dual citizenship-granting countries, which does 
not significantly change the coefficient on dual citizenship obtained from the previous 
estimation. Interestingly, consistent with the notion that developing countries are more 
collectivistic and developed countries more individualistic (Todaro and Smith, 2012), the 
fraction of the diaspora’s population living in dual citizenship granting-countries positively 
affects remittance inflows in the former countries, whereas it has an opposite effect in the latter. 
Indeed, emigrants from developed countries who become citizens of their host countries remit 
less once they reunite their close or nuclear family members with them in their new countries, 
whereas those from developing countries continue to remit to their extended families and 
communities. 
      
4.3 The Effects of Dual Citizenship Legislation on Child Mortality  
In this section, we investigate the role of dual citizenship in alleviating household poverty, 
measured by the under-five child mortality rate. We also investigate the channel through which it 
operates. As we shall see, remittances mediate all the effects of dual citizenship, suggesting that 
dual citizenship and remittances parallel foreign aid in lifting the poor. Following the literature 
(e.g., Ross, 2006), we analyze the logarithmic transformation of the child mortality rate, 
therefore also considering the logarithmic transformation of all the predictors that are 
continuous. This allows us to interpret the coefficients as elasticities.   
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 The results of the estimation of the effect of dual citizenship on child mortality are presented in 
Table 4. In Column 1, only dual citizenship is included, and in Column 2, we additionally control 
for country and period fixed effects, country population size, the size of the diasporic 
populations, inflation rate, and financial development. In both estimations, dual citizenship has a 
positive and statistically significant effect. To investigate the channel through which this effect 
operates, we control for the average GDP and population of destination countries remittances in 
Column 3, for the fraction of the diaspora living in dual citizenship-granting countries in Column 
4, and for remittances in Column 5. We find that while the fraction of the fraction of the diaspora 
living in dual citizenship-granting countries reduces child mortality, its inclusion does not affect 
the size of the effect of dual citizenship. Including remittances however decreases the effect of 
dual citizenship which becomes statistically insignificant, clearly showing that dual citizenship 
recognition improves child survival through stimulating remittances. 
  
In Columns 6-10, we replicate the analysis in Columns 1-5 for developed countries. Dual 
citizenship reduces mortality (Column 6), but this effect disappears after we control for country 
and period fixed effects, country population size, the size of the diasporic populations, inflation 
rate, and the level of financial development (Column 7). We note that the latter variable 
improves child survival, and its effect is persistent across estimations (Columns 8-10). The 
fraction of the diaspora living in dual citizenship-granting countries and remittances worsen child 
mortality (Columns 9-10), a surprising fact which we explain below.   
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The effects of remittances on child survival differ for developing and developed countries. A 
possible explanation is that in developing countries, poor households most often must rely on 
remittances sent from abroad in order to afford basic nutritional needs and better health services 
for their children. This finding is consistent with studies showing that remittances have poverty-
alleviating and consumption-smoothing effects on recipient households (Chami et al., 2009). It is 
also similar to Barajas et al. (2009) who argue that remittances, often used as social insurance, 
help receiving families to primarily afford basic necessities such as food, clothing, medicine and 
shelter. In developed countries, however, remittances are invested into activities that improve the 
economy. In fact, we find that remittances decrease the unemployment rate in developed 
countries, but have no such effect in developing countries (see Appendix Table 7). As the 
economy improves, that increases the price of labor, causing parents to invest more time in 
income-generating activities than in children. Our findings are consistent with studies showing 
that mortality rates are strongly procyclical in developed countries (see, e.g., Ruhm (2000) for 
the U.S.). The adverse effect of the fraction of the diaspora in dual citizenship-granting countries 
on child survival in developed countries could also be explained by the fact that this variable 
positively affects the economy of these countries (see Section 4.1), producing an impact similar 
to that of foreign remittances. 
 
5 Comparing Dual Citizenship with other Institutional Variables 
In this section, we compare the effects of dual citizenship and other institutional variables on 
child survival. This comparison is motivated by the fact that dual citizenship is primarily viewed 
as an institution by political scientists, and it is consistent with the literature on the comparative 
effects of institutions on political and economic outcomes (North, 1991; Sokoloff and Engerman, 
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2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002; Ross, 2006). The other institutional variables we 
use are government stability, and the absence of internal and external conflicts.5   
 
The results are presented in Table 5. We control for a range of variables. While two of the 
institutional variables (government stability and absence of internal conflicts) improve child 
survival in developing countries, their effects are smaller than that of dual citizenship. In 
developed countries, dual citizenship recognition reduces mortality, but its effect is not 
statistically significant. The absence of internal conflicts, however, increases mortality. In results 
not shown, we also find that in the absence of internal conflicts, less public funding is allocated 
to public health, which suggests that internal conflicts may put pressure on the government to 
dedicate more funding to social programs that improve child welfare and survival. We also note 
that while internal conflicts are usually armed conflicts in developing countries, in developed 
countries, they take the form of civil disorder and strikes, and are organized to induce more 
social justice, which benefits lower-income households and improves welfare in general. The 
effect of internal conflicts for developed countries is therefore less surprising when the rationale 
behind those conflicts is taken into account.  
 
Overall, it follows from our analysis that dual citizenship has a greater effect on child survival 
than other institutional variables both in developing and developed countries.  
 
                                                 
5 Information on these variables is available only for the period 1984-2007. To avoid losing data in our analysis, for 
each variable, we set all missing values to zero, and we control for a dummy indicator for missing information.   
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6 Conclusion 
We have analyzed the economic impacts of dual citizenship legislation for both developing and 
developed countries. A country that permits dual citizenship allows members of its diaspora to 
retain several benefits in their homeland, including unrestricted entry and residency, easy access 
to investment and other economic opportunities, property ownership, and entitlement to social 
programs and other public goods. We argue that dual citizenship recognition therefore provides 
multiple incentives for members of the diaspora to keep ties with family, friends and 
communities in the origin country. These private international relations mobilize transfers of 
resources from the destination country to the origin country, improving household living 
conditions and the national economy. 
 
Using a newly assembled dataset on dual citizenship legislation, we have found that dual 
citizenship recognition in developing countries increases remittance inflows, raises GDP and 
household consumption, and improves child survival. Also, dual citizenship recognition is more 
effective in improving child survival than other institutional variables such as government 
stability and the absence of internal and external conflicts. In developed countries, dual 
citizenship recognition increases gross capital formation and FDI net inflows, raises household 
consumption, fosters trade, and stimulates international labor mobility. We have found no effect 
of dual citizenship on public spending on health and education, suggesting that the diaspora 
plays little role in homeland politics, and lending credence to the notion that dual citizenship 
recognition itself is mostly exogenous to external pressure. Importantly, however, we have 
controlled for several variables capturing external pressure, delivering finding that are interesting 




Dual citizenship is a hotly debated topic among political scientists, lawyers, and in the policy 
circle. Its recognition leads to countries sharing citizens and their potentials, as it fosters the free 
flow of people, money, and goods across national borders. In this paper, we have shown that dual 
citizenship recognition generates huge economic gains for countries and improves household 
welfare.  
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Figure 1-b Cumulative Frequency of Countries Recognizing Dual Citizenship Rights
 
 
Data Source:  Citizenship Laws of the World database provided by the Office of 
Personnel Management of the US Government and additional information gathered by 
the authors.  
 32

























Dual Citizenship Allowed Dual Citizenship Not Allowed
Developing Countries Developed Countries
 
 
Data Source: Authors’ estimates from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 






    B- Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Full Sample Developing Countries Developed Countries 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dual Citizenship Legislation 0.186 0.389 0.178 0.382 0.213 0.410 
Child Mortality Rate (per thousand) 85.612 79.607 103.329 79.794 18.438 22.855 
Workers' Remittancesb 0.977 2.811 0.803 2.910 1.649 2.284 
Gross Domestic Producta 0.119 0.643 0.036 0.170 0.363 1.211 
Foreign Direct Investmentsa 0.303 1.389 0.116 0.664 0.929 2.536 
Volume of Tradea 4.998 18.673 1.862 9.121 15.674 33.271 
Household Consumption Expendituresa 0.083 0.455 0.023 0.083 0.288 0.915 
Population (billion) 0.023 0.095 0.025 0.108 0.016 0.039 
Gross Capital Formationa 3.079 14.515 1.063 6.841 10.250 27.004 
Domestic Credit to Private Sectora 16.297 120.548 2.129 17.602 64.834 245.656 
Inflation Rate 42.678 426.107 54.729 490.741 6.123 13.586 
Unemployment Rate 9.076 6.937 10.228 7.736 6.681 3.837 
Public Health Spendinga 1.137 5.993 0.163 0.583 4.924 12.521 
Public Spending on Educationa 0.782 4.159 0.175 0.576 2.548 7.917 
Government Stability 7.505 2.070 7.213 2.140 8.366 1.559 
Absence of Internal Conflict 8.570 2.629 7.953 2.533 10.404 1.976 
Absence of External Conflict 9.497 2.248 9.154 2.240 10.517 1.947 
Stock of Emigrants (million) 0.673 2.270 0.439 1.160 1.340 3.911 
Emigration Rate of Low-skilled Workers 0.044 0.072 0.042 0.077 0.047 0.051 
Emigration Rate of Medium-skilled Workers 0.086 0.144 0.094 0.159 0.058 0.064 
Emigration Rate of High-skilled Workers 0.208 0.230 0.234 0.248 0.118 0.114 
Average GDP in destination countriesa 1.05 1.68 0.933 1.60 1.42 1.86 
Average Population in destination countriesb 0.085 0.100 0.082 0.106 0.096 0.079 
% of diaspora in dual citizenship-granting countries 0.255 0.285 0.248 0.286 0.269 0.278 
Detailed information about the variables is provided in Table 6.  
Variables followed by a and b are in US$ trillion and US$ billion, respectively. 
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             Table 2A: Effects of Dual Citizenship Legislation on Macroeconomic Outcomes (Developing Countries) 
 




Volume of Trade 
Variable [OLS] [FE] [OLS] [FE] [OLS] [FE] 




















Country Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 

























Country Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 




1990                 2000 
Medium/High-Skilled 
Emigrant Workers 
1990                 2000 
















n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Country Fixed Effect No Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Period Fixed Effect No Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Detailed information on the variables is provided in Table 6. We control for the percentage of the diaspora living in dual citizenship granting countries and the 
average population of destination countries in all regressions except when estimating the effect of dual citizenship on low-skilled and medium/high-skilled 
immigrant workers. In addition to these controls, we control for population size when estimating the effects of dual citizenship on household consumption 
expenditures, GDP and domestic credit to private sector. We additionally control for GDP in estimating the effect of dual citizenship on public spending on 
education and on public health spending. In the regressions of low-skilled and medium/high-skilled immigrant workers, we control for population size. ***, **, * 







             Table 2B: Effects of Dual Citizenship Legislation on Macroeconomic Outcomes (Developed Countries) 
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Country Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 

























Country Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Period Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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Medium/High-Skilled 
Emigrant Workers 
1990                 2000 
















n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Country Fixed Effect No Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Period Fixed Effect No Yes n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Detailed information on the variables is provided in Table 6. We control for the percentage of the diaspora living in dual citizenship granting countries and the 
average population of destination countries in all regressions except when estimating the effect of dual citizenship on low-skilled and medium/high-skilled 
immigrant workers. In addition to these controls, we control for population size when estimating the effects of dual citizenship on household consumption 
expenditures, GDP and domestic credit to private sector. We additionally control for GDP in estimating the effect of dual citizenship on public spending on 
education and on public health spending. In the regressions of low-skilled and medium/high-skilled immigrant workers, we control for population size. ***, **, * 





Table 3: Effects of Dual Citizenship on Workers’ Remittances 
 Developing Countries Developed Countries 
Variable [OLS] [FE] [FE] [FE] [OLS] [FE] [FE] [FE] 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
































































Average GDP of Destination Countries   0.335*** 
(6.11) 
   -0.289 
(-1.28) 
 








% of diaspora in Dual Citizenship granting Countries    0.646** 
(2.06) 
   -1.56* 
(-1.75) 
Period Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
# Countries 125 122 117 117 28 28 28 28 
# Observations 719 636 523 523 194 189 162 162 
R-squared 0.0029 0.7131 0.6429 0.6130 0.0213 0.5140 0.5645 0.5695 
Detailed information on the variables is provided in Table 6. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4: Effects of Dual Citizenship on Child Mortality (The dependent variable is the log of child mortality) 
 
 Developing Countries Developed Countries 
Variable [OLS] [FE] [FE] [FE] [FE] [OLS] [FE] [FE] [FE] [FE] 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
































































































Log(Average Population of Destination 
Countries) 
  -0.1288*** 
(-3.38) 
    0.1423** 
(2.22) 
  
Log(% of diaspora in Dual Citizenship 
granting Countries) 








Log(Workers’ Remittances)     -0.0195** 
(-2.14) 
    0.0471** 
(2.31) 
Period Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Countries 123 123 118 118 116 37 34 34 34 27 
# Observations 1230 817 696 696 514 344 279 245 245 158 
R-squared 0.0758 0.8187 0.8210 0.8168 0.7920 0.0827 0.9377 0.9373 0.9413 0.9408 





















Table 5: Effects of Dual Citizenship and Other Institutional Variables on Child Mortality 
Panel A: Developing Countries     
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] 








Absence of Internal Conflict -0.009* 
(-1.76) 
  -0.002 
(-0.34) 




























































Period Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Countries 118 118 118 118 
# Observations 696 696 703 703 
R-squared 0.8414 0.8406 0.8407 0.8409 















  0.032** 
(2.27) 




































































Period Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Countries 34 34 34 34 
# Observations 245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0.9452 0.9443 0.9444 0.9459 
Detailed information on the variables is provided in Table 6. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 6: Definition of Variables and Sources of Data 
Variable Definition and Sources 
Institutional Variables:  
Dual Citizenship Dual Citizenship is a binary variable that takes on value 1 if a country allows dual citizenship and 0 otherwise. Part 
of our data comes from the Citizenship Laws of the World (2001) database, Office of the Personnel Management of 
the US Government. The other portion comes from our own search. 
Absence of Internal Conflict Absence of internal conflict (civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, Conflict civil disorder; ranges 0 to 
12, with a higher score meaning very low risk; provided by Political Risk Services/International Country Risk Guide 
(PRS/ICRG). 
Absence of External Conflict Absence of external conflict (war, cross-border conflicts and foreign pressures); ranges from 0 to 12, with a higher 
score meaning very low risk; provided by PRS/ICRG. 
Government Stability Composite index of government stability based on government unity, legislative strength and popular support; ranges 
from 0 to 12, with a higher score meaning very higher stability, provided by PRS/ICRG. 
Connectedness Between Diasporas and Origin Countries: 
Workers' Remittancesb Funds sent from abroad, defined as workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (current US$); 
provided by World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank (2011). 
Child Mortality Rate (per thousand) Risk of dying before the fifth birthday; measured in per 1000; provided by World Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank (2011). 
Macroeconomic Outcomes:  
GDPa Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (current US$); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Inflation Rate Consumer prices (annual %); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Domestic Credit to Private Sectora Domestic credit to private sector is defined as financial resources provided to the private sector; provided by WDI, 
World Bank (2011). 
Unemployment Rate Percentage of unemployed individuals in the labor force; provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Gross Capital Formationa Gross capital formation (current US$); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Stock of Emigrantsb International migration stock; provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Volume of Tradea Merchandise trade (sum of exports and imports); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
FDI Net Inflowsa Foreign Direct Investments Net Inflows; provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Household Expendituresa Household final consumption expenditures (current US$); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Population (billion) Total population, the values are midyear estimates; provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Emigration Rates Emigration rates of low-, medium- and high-skilled workers; provided by Docquier and Marfouk (2005). 
Average GDP in Destination Countriesa Authors’ estimations based on data provided by Ozden et al. (2011). 
Average Population of Destination Countries Authors’ estimations based on data provided by Ozden et al. (2011). 
% of diaspora in Dual Citizenship granting Countries Authors’ estimations based on data provided by Ozden et al. (2011). 
Variables Related to Public Spending on Social Programs: 
Health Public Spendinga Total volume of public health expenditures (current US$); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
Public Spending on educationa Total volume of public spending on education (current US$); provided by WDI, World Bank (2011). 
All the variables indexed with “a" and “b" are in US$ trillion and US$ billion, respectively. 
Table 7: Effect of Workers’ Remittances on Unemployment Rate (%). 
 
Variable Developing Countries Developed Countries 
 [OLS] [FE] [OLS] [FE] 








Period Effect No Yes No Yes 
Country Effect No Yes No Yes 
# Countries 124 124 31 31 
# Observations 436 436 162 162 
R-squared 0.0331 0.0658 0.0481 0.2099 
Detailed information on the variables is provided in Table 6. The unemployment rate is calculated as the percentage of unemployed 
individuals in the labor force.We controlled for population size in both the OLS and the fixed effect regressions. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
 
 41
Table 8: List of Countries Included the Analysis 
 
Low and Middle Income Countries High Income Countries: OECD and non-OECD 
Albania Congo, Rep, Indonesia Mozambique St, Kitts and Nevis Andorra Singapore 
Algeria Costa Rica Iran, Islamic Rep, Myanmar St, Lucia Australia Slovenia 
Angola Cote d'Ivoire Iraq Namibia St, Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Austria Spain 
Antigua and Barbuda Croatia Jamaica Nepal Sudan Bahamas, The Sweden 
Argentina Czech Republic Jordan Nicaragua Suriname Bahrain Switzerland 
Armenia Djibouti Kazakhstan Niger Swaziland Belgium United Arab Emirates 
Azerbaijan Dominica Kenya Nigeria Syrian Arab Republic Brunei Darussalam United Kingdom 
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Kiribati Oman Tajikistan Canada United States 
Barbados Ecuador Kyrgyz Republic Pakistan Tanzania Cyprus  
Belarus Egypt, Arab Rep, Lao PDR Panama Thailand Denmark  
Belize El Salvador Latvia Papua New Guinea Togo Finland  
Benin Equatorial Guinea Lebanon Paraguay Tonga France  
Bhutan Eritrea Lesotho Peru Trinidad and Tobago Germany  
Bolivia Estonia Liberia Philippines Tunisia Greece  
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia Libya Poland Turkey Iceland  
Botswana Fiji Lithuania Romania Turkmenistan Ireland  
Brazil Gabon Macedonia, FYR Russian Federation Uganda Israel  
Bulgaria Gambia, The Madagascar Rwanda Ukraine Italy  
Burkina Faso Georgia Malawi Samoa Uruguay Japan  
Burundi Ghana Malaysia Sao Tome and Principe Vanuatu Korea, Rep,  
Cambodia Grenada Maldives Senegal Venezuela, RB Kuwait  
Cameroon Guatemala Mali Serbia Vietnam Luxembourg  
Cape Verde Guinea Malta Seychelles Yemen, Rep, Monaco  
Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Sierra Leone Zambia Netherlands  
Chad Guyana Mauritius Slovak Republic Zimbabwe New Zealand  
Chile Haiti Mexico Solomon Islands  Norway  
China Honduras Moldova Somalia  Portugal  
Colombia Hungary Mongolia South Africa  Qatar  
Comoros India Morocco Sri Lanka  Saudi Arabia  
We use the World Bank classification of developing countries as low and middle-income economies, and developed countries as high income economies (OECD 
and non-OECD countries).  
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